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Abstract. Requirements are informal and semi-formal descriptions of the expected behavior of a com-
plex system from the viewpoints of its stakeholders (customers, users, operators, designers, and engi-
neers). However, for the purpose of design, testing, and verification for critical systems, we can transform
requirements into formal models that can be analyzed automatically. ARSENAL is a framework and
methodology for systematically transforming natural language (NL) requirements into analyzable for-
mal models and logic specifications. These models can be analyzed for consistency and implementability.
The ARSENAL methodology is specialized to individual domains, but the approach is general enough
to be adapted to new domains.
1 Introduction
Natural language (NL) processing and understanding is becoming increasingly important in the field of
requirements engineering. Requirements specify important properties of software systems, e.g., conditions
required to achieve an objective, or desired system invariants. Requirements in formal languages are precise
and useful for checking consistency and verifying properties, but can be cumbersome to specify. As a result,
stakeholders often prefer writing NL requirements — these can be written easily without burden of formal
rigor, but can be inherently imprecise, incomplete, and ambiguous. NL descriptions and formal modeling
languages each offer distinct advantages to the system designer — we aim to leverage the best of both, to aid
the system designer in coming up with the first-cut of a formal model from NL requirements in an automated
fashion. This model can then be refined through iterations with the human in the loop – this could enable cost
reduction in system design, while providing high levels of assurance for critical systems. The main objective
of this paper is to answer the question: “Can we design such a methodology that combines the strengths
of natural and formal languages for requirements engineering?” With this goal in mind, we present the
methodology of ARSENAL: “Automatic Requirements Specification Extraction from Natural Language’.
In this paper, we focus on mapping NL requirements to transition systems expressed in SAL and logic
specifications in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), for safety critical systems. SAL [BGL+00] is a formal language
for specifying transition systems in a compositional way (details in Section 3.2), while LTL [MP92] is a logic
for describing temporal properties. Figure 1 shows a set of requirements from the FAA-Isolette domain and
the SAL model snippet automatically generated by ARSENAL — it shows how different parts of the SAL
model are constructed from different requirements sentences. This is a simple model generated automatically
by ARSENAL from 4 requirements sentences — in some of our domains, ARSENAL was able to generate a full
model from 30+ requirements sentences in an automated fashion, which is a non-trivial task even for expert
human users. ARSENAL is able to create a complete formal model from a set of NL requirements sentences by
using a combination of approaches: preprocessing, type rules, intermediate language representation, output
adapters, and powerful formal methods tools.
ARSENAL has two stages — Section 2 gives an overview of the Natural Language Processing (NLP)
stage, while Section 3 gives an overview of the Formal Methods (FM) stage. We evaluate ARSENAL in
Section 4 and conclude in Section 6.
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Fig. 1: Example showing a SAL Model snippet created from a set of NL requirements. Numbers annotating
different parts of the SAL model correspond to the numbers of the requirements sentences.
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Fig. 2: NLP Stage of ARSENAL pipeline.
2 Natural Language Processing
The NLP stage takes NL requirements as input and generates a set of logical formulas as output. The
different components of the NLP stage (Figure 2) are described in this section.
2.1 Preprocessor
The first part of the NLP stage is a preprocessor, which enables the use of a general-purpose semantic parser
downstream. It uses both domain-specific and domain-independent preprocessing. Domain-specific prepro-
cessing includes identifying entity n-grams like “Lower Desired Temperature” (based on an input ontology)
and converting them to terms like Lower Desired Temperature. Domain-independent preprocessing tasks
include identifying arithmetic expressions, e.g., replacing “[x + 5]” by ARITH x PLUS 5, so that the parser
treats this as one instead of five terms. The preprocessor also encodes complex phrases like “is greater than
or equal to” as simpler terms like dominates, which can be decoded in the succeeding FM stage as necessary.
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2.2 Stanford Typed Dependency Parser
The next part of the NLP stage is the application of the Stanford Typed Dependency Parser
(STDP) [dMMM06] to the preprocessed sentence — it generates a set of typed dependency (TD) triples,
which encode the grammatical relationship between mentions (i.e., unique entities) extracted from a sentence.
TDs are of the form: relation (governor, dependent). For example, consider:
prep of(Status attribute-3, Lower Desired Temperature-6)
The above TD indicates that the mention Status attribute is related to Lower Desired Temperature
via the prepositional connective “of”. The suffix of each mention is its position index in the sentence, which
helps to uniquely identify the mention if it has multiple occurrences in the sentence. We will denote governor
and dependent terms by ?g and ?d respectively.
Let us consider the following example requirements specification sentence for a temperature regulator in
an isolette (an infant incubator providing controlled temperature, humidity, and oxygen):
REQ1: If the Status attribute of the Lower Desired Temperature is invalid, the Regulator Interface Failure
shall be set to True.
For REQ1, the full set of TDs generated by STDP maps straightforwardly to a directed graph rooted at
set-14, as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3: Dependencies generated using STDP.
Fig. 4: Predicate graph after applying the type
rules.
2.3 Semantic Processor
One key challenge we face in ARSENAL is the mapping from NL sentences to LTL formulas in a way
that the LTL semantics are correctly preserved. The output of STDP is a set of grammatical relations
that lack semantic meaning — we developed a semantic processor that takes the output from STDP and
systematically applies a set of type rules to the mentions and dependencies to associate meanings to them.
Each type rule specifies a mapping from a set of dependencies (grammatical relations between mentions) to
a set of predicates with built-in semantics. The semantic processor generates an Intermediate Representation
(IR) by annotating the output of STDP with metadata tags and by the consecutive application of type rules.
The overall algorithm for generating logical formulas from NL requirements is outlined in Figure 5, while
metadata tags and type rules are described in the rest of this section.
Metadata tags Different types of metadata tags are used to annotate the IR table entries, indicating if
terms are entities/events/predicates, if terms are negated, quantifier types, temporal relations, etc.
These tags are used to associate semantics with entries in the IR table. The metadata tags are similar to
role annotations in automatic semantic role labeling [CFR12]. In this stage, ARSENAL uses WordNet [Mil95]
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Input: Requirements text, WordNet, Domain-specific ontology, TypeRules,
Pre-processing rules.
Output: Logical formulas in DSL syntax.
1. Run the requirement text through Stanford Dependency Parser:
This produces a graph of Typed Dependencies (TDs), and part of speech
(POS) tags for all the words in the sentence.
2. Create a Mention Table: Select each MentionId in Stanford Parser output
and creating a hash from MentionId to all typed dependencies (TDs) it is
involved in.
3. Initialize IR: Empty at beginning.
4. Populate the IR: Iterate over MentionIds in the Mention Table in sequence.
For each MentionId:
(a) Get the POS tag for the MentionId.
(b) Set word to the stem of the word (from the WordNet stemmer) and add
an IR entry for the word.
(c) If word is a math expression encoded by the math preprocessor, set its
IR type to arithmetic.
(d) Else if word is marked as a unique entity in the ontology, set its IR type
to entity and its quantifier to unique.
(e) Else if word is marked as predicate in the ontology, set its IR type to
pred.
(f) Else if word is a number, set its IR type to num.
(g) Else if word has a noun POS tag, set its IR type to entity. In addition,
if the word is not found in WordNet, set its quantifier to unique (as it
is presumably a proper name).
(h) Else if word has a verb POS tag, set its type to event.
5. Execute the type rules during DFS traversal of the TD graph: For
each MentionId in the Mention Table, for each TD associated with MentionId
in the Mention Table, for each type rule TR:
(a) Try to match the left-hand-size (LHS) of TR with the TD, where the
TR produces TD1.
(b) If step 5(a) was successful, i.e., the the LHS of TR matches TD, execute
the right-hand-side of TD1.
6. Generate logical formulas from IR: Use Recursive Expression Transla-
tion to generate logical formulas.
Fig. 5: Detailed algorithmic flow of NLP stage.
and a Part-of Speech (POS) tagger to identify word stems and to infer unique proper nouns. ARSENAL
can also use special domain-specific ontologies or glossaries to annotate the IR entries with a richer set of
metadata tags, which can be used in downstream processing.
Type Rules The majority of type rules are domain-independent semantic rules used by the semantic
processor to create the IR table — each type rule specifies a mapping from a set of dependencies to a
set of relational predicates, with built-in semantics. For example, nsubjpass(V, N) in the STDP output
indicates that the noun phrase N is the syntactic subject of a passive clause with the root verb V . The
type rule corresponding to the TD nsubjpass(V, N) indicates that N is a who/what argument of relation
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V in the output formula. Type rules have the form: TD(arg1,arg2): ACTION(arg3,arg4). For example:
prep upon(?g,?d): implies(?d,?g)
Matching of Typed Dependencies with Type Rules: Matching this rule with the TD
prep upon(entering-17, set-4) produces a match with ?g = entering-17, ?d = set-4, with an ac-
tion implies(set-4, entering-17). The implies(?d,?g) action adds impliedBy:?d to the IR entry for
?g.
ARSENAL has various type rules, e.g., for handling implications, conjunctions/disjunctions, univer-
sal/existential quantifiers, temporal attributes/relations, relation arguments, events.
Rules with complex patterns: Some type rules have multiple TDs or conditions that match on the
left-hand side. For example: nsubj(?g,?d) & event(?g): rel(agent,?g,?d)
Status attribute-3 : Status attribute | entity | unique
| of=Lower Desired Temperature-6
Lower Desired Temperature-6 : Lower Desired Temperature | entity | unique
equals-7 : equal | predicate | arg2=Invalid-8,
arg1=Status attribute-3
Invalid-8 : Invalid | entity
Regulator Interface Failure-11 : Regulator Interface Failure | entity | unique
be-13 : be | event
set-14 : set | event | to=True-16, object=
Regulator Interface Failure-11
| impliedBy: [equals-7]
True-16 : True | bool
Fig. 6: IR table for REQ1.
Figure 6 shows the IR table for REQ1 after application of the type rules. Currently the type rules are
created by domain experts, aided by a statistics generator that finds the dominant dependencies in a corpus.
However, most type rules are domain-independent and can be re-used in other domains — the domain-
dependent ones need to be customized by tuning based on a training corpus1. We expect that the set of type
rules will evolve towards quasi-completion with the adoption of ARSENAL in cross-industry domains.
2.4 Formula Generation
There are multiple output adapters in ARSENAL, which convert the IR table (with the semantic annotations)
to different output forms, e.g., first-order logic (FOL) and linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas. In this
paper, we discuss the SAL model adapter, which converts the IR table to LTL formulas that are used in
creating a downstream SAL model. An LTL formula is interpreted over infinite traces and is built from atomic
propositions, Boolean operators (i.e. negations, conjunctions and disjunctions), and temporal operators (e.g.,
G operator for always globally true, in every point of a trace). ARSENAL uses Recursive Expression
Translation (RET) rules to generate the LTL formulas from the predicate graph. For example, to generate
an LTL formula from the predicate graph shown in Figure 4, we can employ the subset of RET rules in
Table 1.
We use e(X) to denote the expression associated with mention X, which we will repeatedly rewrite
during the translation process. If mention X is associated with a unique term, i.e., unique(X), its expression
1 The set of type rules used by ARSENAL are available at: http://www.csl.sri.com/users/shalini/arsenal/
type_rules.txt.
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Table 1: Partial list of Recursive Expression Translation Rules
Predicate Expression Translation
unique(X) tru(e(X)) : e(X)
of(X, Y ) trl(e(X)) : trm(e(Y )).trm(e(X))
set(X) ∧ arg1(X, Y ) ∧ arg2(X, Z) trm(e(X)) : tru(e(Y )) = tru(e(Z))
equal(X) ∧ arg1(X, Y ) ∧ arg2(X, Z) trm(e(X)) : tru(e(Y )) = tru(e(Z))
impliedBy(X, Y ) trl(e(X)) : trm(e(Y )) → trm(e(X))
is simply the English word in the mention, e.g., e(Invalid-8) = Invalid. Given a predicate graph, we
recursively apply the translation rules starting from the root (set-14 in this case). The superscripts u, m
and l indicate the types of the translation rule for unique terms, simple arithmetic expressions and logical
expressions respectively. When multiple rules are applicable to the same mention, they are applied in the
order of trl followed by trm and then tru. FORM1, the resulting LTL formula of REQ1 after applying the
translation rules, is shown below:
FORM1: G((Lower Desired Temperature
.Status attribute = Invalid) => Regulator Interface Failure = TRUE)
The recursive expression translation is equivalent to running a DFS traversal on the predicate graph with
emissions. Every requirement is considered to be global except when certain indicative words such as “ini-
tialize” are present in the sentence. Since G p holds of a computation when condition p holds of all suffixes
of the computation, we have the G operator in front of the formulas.
2.5 Graph Transformations: Dependency Graph → Predicate Graph → Formula
The NLP stage can be considered as a sequence of graph transformations. The result of applying STDP can
be represented as a dependency graph, which is a directed graph that shows the type dependencies (Figure 3).
The IR table can be considered to be an annotated adjacency list corresponding to the dependency graph,
where additional annotations are stored in the IR table along with the type dependency information —
these annotations correspond to metadata generated by type rules. During generation of the logical formula
FORM1, the dependency graph is transformed to a predicate graph. The predicate graph selects and refines
the relations in the IR that are relevant for the output language. The predicate graph for REQ1 is shown
in Figure 4, where the edges represent binary predicates (with predefined meanings). The unique unary
predicates are indicated by boxes in the figure. Additionally, mentions of indicative words such as “equals”
and “set” are associated with predefined predicates equal and set. For example, the predicate set means that
its first argument (object) is a variable being set to a value which is its second argument (to). The semantic
information in the predicate graph is further interpreted in the FM stage, based on the target language and
additional information about the model.
The NLP stage interprets the NL of the input specifications in the context of an application domain
and usages that are specific to this domain. This provides several constraints that give useful context for
narrowing different interpretations of the NL, which enables the user to generate NL input specifications
without restricting the modes of expression to particular templates.
3 Formal Analysis
In this section, we discuss the Formal Methods (FM) stage in detail. The overall flow of the FM stage is shown
in Figure 7 – this stage takes as input a set of logical formulas as generated by the NLP stage and creates
a composite formal model. The FM stage uses a combination of consistency, satisfiability and realizability
checks to formally validate the completeness/correctness of the requirements.
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Fig. 7: FM Stage of ARSENAL pipeline.
3.1 Consistency Analysis
Requirements are as error-prone as implementation, and can themselves be inconsistent. In our context,
inconsistencies can arise from human errors in writing the NL requirements or from inaccuracies introduced
by ARSENAL. Given a set of requirements formalized as LTL formulas, we check if there exists a model for
the formulas, i.e., they are satisfiable. If the formulas are unsatisfiable, then it can be due to errors in the
specification or due to errors in the NLP stage – in our experiments, we empirically evaluate the robustness
of the NLP stage, to determine how much of the error can be attributed to the NLP stage in ARSENAL.
The problem of LTL satisfiability checking can be reduced to checking emptiness of
Bu¨chi automata [Var96]. Given an LTL formula φ, we can construct a Bu¨chi automaton Aφ such
that the language of Aφ is exactly equivalent to the model of φ [VW94]. If the language of Aφ is empty
then φ is unsatisfiable, indicating an inconsistency in the requirements — we report this inconsistency to
the ARSENAL end-user. Otherwise, we proceed to creating the SAL model, as shown in Figure 7.
3.2 Model Checking
A SAL model [BGL+00] represents a transition system whose semantics is given by a Kripke structure,
which is a kind of nondeterministic automaton widely used in model checking [CGP99]. SAL can be used
to prove theorems by encoding properties about the requirements and using bounded model-checking. The
SAL model-checkers use LTL — this is an appropriate language for formally expressing requirements, since
many requirements contain notions of temporal relations, e.g., eventually (F), always (G).
A transition system like SAL is composed of modules, where each module consists of a state type, an
invariant definition, an initialization condition, and a binary transition relation on the state type. Creating
a complete SAL model directly from text with correct semantics is non-trivial, since formulas need to be
categorized as definition, initialization, transition, or theorem. Each variable in SAL is also typed, which
needs to be explicitly specified. During the model generation stage, ARSENAL gathers type evidences for
each variable across all sentences, and then performs type inference by merging them into equivalence classes
(details of the type merging algorithm are omitted here due to lack of space). Further, in case of a type
conflict, an inconsistency warning is generated, thus helping the user to refine their NL requirements at an
early stage.
When the model does not satisfy the specification, a negative answer (often in the form of a counterex-
ample) is presented to the user as a certificate of how the system fails the specification — if SAL finds a
counterexample, we know the property encoded in the requirements does not hold. If SAL does not find
a counterexample at a known depth of model-checking, we next try to see if the LTL formulas are realiz-
able. Once the specification becomes realizable, an implementation can be generated automatically, e.g., in
Verilog2.
2 An example of a synthesized Verilog model for the FAA domain is available at: http://www.csl.sri.com/users/
shalini/arsenal/faa-isolette.v
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Table 2: Results of perturbation test on ARSENAL.
Perturbation TTEthernet domain (TTE) FAA-Isolette domain (FAA)
Type Total Perturbed Accuracy Total Perturbed Accuracy
sentences sentences sentences sentences
And → Or 36 16 87% 42 13 92%
Is → (Is not) 36 17 100% 42 13 92%
(If A then B) → (B if A) 36 N/A N/A 42 40 65%
3.3 Temporal Logic Synthesis
Given an LTL specification, it may also be possible to directly synthesize an implementation that satisfies
the specification. It has been shown that a subclass of LTL, known as Generalized Reactivity (1) [GR(1)], is
more amenable to synthesis [PP06] and is also expressive enough for specifying complex industrial designs.
We have incorporated into ARSENAL a counterstrategy-guided assumption mining approach developed for
GR(1) LTL formulas [LDS11], which allows adding assumptions to the formulas until either the specification
is realizable or all the recommendations are rejected by the user.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we present results on analyzing ARSENAL’s ability in handling complex NL sentences and
different corpora. We measure (a) the robustness of ARSENAL to noise, and (b) the accuracy of the NLP
stage.
4.1 Degree of Perturbation Metric
We define an evaluation criteria for measuring the robustness of ARSENAL — if modifications are made to a
requirements sentence using some rewrite rules, can ARSENAL still generate the right output formula? For
the FAA and TTE datasets, we perturbed the requirements using a few transform operators — the results are
outlined in Table 2. Let us consider the first row of the table – the operator modifies all occurrences of “and”
in a sentence with “or”. The “Perturbed sentences” column indicates how many sentences in the corpus were
affected by applying this operator, and “Accuracy” indicates the percentage of perturbed sentences where
the output formula was correct.
4.2 NLP Stage Accuracy
Our goal here was evaluating the accuracy of the NLP stage of ARSENAL. There are existing metrics to
calculate the degree of overlap between two semantic feature structures, e.g., Smatch [CK13] uses ILP and
hill-climbing. For ARSENAL, we took the more direct approach of estimating how many sub-formulas are
inserted, deleted or modified by ARSENAL in the NLP stage, while generating the output formula for a
requirements sentence. We considered a ground-truth corpus (requirements sentences annotated with the
expected output formula) and used the following algorithm:
1. Given each requirements sentence in this ground-truth corpus, generate all sub-formulas G of the
ground-truth formula and all sub-formulas A of the formula generated by ARSENAL.
2. For each sub-formula in A, find the best-matching sub-formulas in G using a relaxed version of max-
weighted matching in bipartite graphs – the match score between formulas is calculated using Typed Leven-
shtein distance, a variant of the standard Levenshtein edit distance, which we designed (details below).
3. Calculate precision, recall and F-measure using similarity between matched pairs of sub-formulas.
Typed Levenshtein Distance is a modification of Levenshtein string edit distance for formulas, which
considers distances between logical symbols, variables and string tokens differentially. Figure 8 outlines the
computation — here, d is the Typed Levenshtein distance, IC is insertion cost, DC is the deletion cost, seq1
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d[i][j] = if seq1[i] == seq2[j]
then d[i+1][j+1]
else
min(IC + d[i+1][j], DC + d[i][j+1],
c(seq1[i], seq2[j]) + d[i+1][j+1])
Fig. 8: Computation of Typed Levenshtein distance.
and seq2 are the two sequences, and c(A, B) is the cost of replacing A by B. We consider that each formula
can have 3 types of tokens: (1) LogicalSymbol Token (e.g., “and”, “or”): c(A,B) = 1 if A 6= B; (2) String
Token (e.g., argument name): c(A,B) = LevenshteinStringEditDistance(A,B); (3) Variable Token: c(A,B) =
0, since there should be no cost for changing variable names.
We evaluated the F-measure of the NLP stage of ARSENAL on sections in the TTE requirements [SD10].
We also ran the evaluation on requirements from the GPCA, LTLMop and Eurail requirements documents.
We trained ARSENAL (e.g., tuned the preprocessing rules) on some of the requirements sentences, and
evaluated the F-measure only on the hold-out test set on which ARSENAL was not trained in any way.
Considering the different corpora, there were overall 300 sentences — of these, we used 112 sentences as the
training set for tuning ARSENAL (from the FAA and TTE requirements), and evaluated the performance of
ARSENAL on the remaining 188 sentences that were held out. Table 3 shows the results — on the test set of
188 requirements, the NLP stage had an overall F-measure of 0.63. Note that none of the requirements from
the EUR, GPCA and LTLMop corpora were used in tuning ARSENAL, but we get good test set accuracy
on these domains, which shows the portability of ARSENAL.
Table 3: NLP stage F-Measure on different test-set corpora.
Corpus Test set size Test set F-measure
TTE 72 0.65
EUR 11 0.58
GPCA 70 0.62
LTLMop 35 0.64
Total 188 0.63
Here are some example errors made by ARSENAL on different domains:
A) TTEthernet (TTE) requirements:
REQ: A supported write access to the AMBA 3 AHB-Lite V1.0 slave interface shall be processed and terminated
with response OKAY.
Since there is no TD between “write” and “access”, everything that follows in the dependency tree is
missing from the formula. This can be fixed by adding a preprocessing entry that treats “write access” as
an n-gram in this domain.
REQ: If the ct mode entry of a CT ID provided at a critical frame output interface is set to anything but OUT,
layer 3 shall set the Fo State Im flag of the Fo State field and drop the current transfer on that interface.
The phrase “anything but”, another way of stating a negation, it not currently handled by ARSENAL
— so the output formula misses a sub-formula.
B) Eurail requirements:
REQ: A Radio Infill Unit shall never initiate a communication session.
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The negation is missing from the generated ARSENAL formula, because our type rules interpret “never”
as a temporal attribute rather than a normal negation. We can extend type rules to understand “never” as
negation in the correct context.
4.3 Case Study: FAA-Isolette (FAA)
We also did detailed case studies of the FAA and TTE requirements3 — we start with a discussion of FAA
requirements. Figure 9 (a) shows one of the finite state machines corresponding to the regulator function of
the isolette. An example requirements sentence is shown below.
REQ: If the Regulator Mode equals INIT and the Regulator Status equals True, the Regulator Mode shall be set
to NORMAL.
Fig. 9: Original FSM (a) and Modified FSM (b) for Regulator.
Fig. 10: Synchronization FSM in
TTEthernet
This experiment seeks to evaluate if ARSENAL can faithfully generate the transition system correspond-
ing to the description (including the FSM) in the design document. Verification was used to validate the
generated FAA model, corresponding to the following SAL theorem generated by ARSENAL:
THEOREM main |- G((Regulator_Mode=FAILED => NOT(F(Regulator_Mode=NORMAL))));
This sentence states that if the FSM is in the FAILED state, then it cannot go back to the NORMAL
state. Applying model checking, we verified that the generated SAL model satisfied the theorem.
We added a sentence corresponding to the transition from FAILED to INIT state (see Figure 9 (b)). For
the modified model, ARSENAL quickly produced a counterexample that showed a path from the FAILED
state to the NORMAL state exists, thus violating the aforementioned theorem. This demonstrates that
the SAL model generated automatically by ARSENAL found the injected inconsistency. After performing
satisfiability check, we next tried realizability check. Application of LTL [GR(1)] synthesis to these for-
mulas produced an unrealizable result — no implementation existed to satisfy the formulas. When both
Regulator Status and Regulator Init Timeout are true , the state machine (see Figure 9) can nondeter-
ministically choose to go to either the NORMAL state or the FAILED state, from INIT. Such behavior is
not desirable in an actual implementation, so this specification is not realizable. ARSENAL produced the
following candidate assumption to make the specification realizable.
G !(Regulator_Status=1 & Regulator_Init_Timeout=1);
3 The requirements corpora for the FAA-Isolette and TTEthernet domains, and the corresponding SAL models
generated by ARSENAL, are available at: http://www.csl.sri.com/users/shalini/arsenal/.
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Once the NL sentences describing the transitions are written differently, such that Regulator Status=1 and
Regulator Init Timeout=1 are mutually exclusive, the specification becomes realizable and an implemen-
tation can be generated automatically.
4.4 Case Study: TTEthernet (TTE)
In the TTEthernet corpus, we consider the NL requirements that describe the synchronization state machine
in TTEthernet. Figure 10 shows the diagram of this state machine (conditions for transitions are not shown).
The machine starts at the ES INTEGRATE state, and the ES SYNC ABS state indicates that the end-system has
synchronized with other systems in the cluster. This corpus contains 36 sentences. ARSENAL can handle
complex requirements sentences, generating the correct formula automatically. An example, describing part
of the behavior in the ES UNSYNC state, is shown below.
REQ3: When an end system is in ES UNSYNC state and receives a coldstart frame, it shall (a) transit to
ES FLOOD state, (b) set local timer to es cs offset, (c) set local clock to 0, (d) set local integration cycle to
0, and (e) set local membership comp to 0.
Note that this sentence has a more complicated structure than REQ1 and includes five itemized actions.
From the overall SAL model generated automatically, the part corresponding to REQ3 is shown in Figure 11.
Observe that ARSENAL was able to infer that the end-system has an enumerated type (Type0) which
contains named values ES UNSYNC state and ES FLOOD state. It was also able to set correctly the type of
local integration cycle and local membership comp to INTEGER. In this example, the user asserted
that all the five LOCAL variables are state variables. Hence, the actions over these variables were considered
as state updates and mapped to the TRANSITION section. The formula generated by the SAL adapter
corresponding to REQ3 is therefore placed in this section of the SAL model.
tte_example : CONTEXT =
BEGIN
Type0 : TYPE = {ES_UNSYNC_state, ES_FLOOD_state};
Type1 : TYPE = {coldstart_frame}; Type2 : TYPE = {es_cs_offset};
main : MODULE =
BEGIN
LOCAL local_integration_cycle : INTEGER
LOCAL local_membership_comp : INTEGER
LOCAL local_clock : INTEGER
LOCAL end_system : Type0
LOCAL local_timer : Type2
INPUT in_channel : Type1
TRANSITION
[ (end_system = ES_UNSYNC_state AND in_channel =
coldstart_frame) --> end_system’ = ES_FLOOD_state;
local_timer’ = es_cs_offset; local_clock’ = 0;
local_integration_cycle’ = 0; local_membership_comp’ = 0 ]
END;
END
Fig. 11: SAL Model for REQ3.
A formal method expert was asked to review the model and found it was compatible with (and in fact,
included more information than) a similar model that he handcrafted in [SD10]. We then asked one of
the original creators of the TTEthernet documentation to provide a high-level specification that should be
verified for this model. The sentence in English is given below, followed by the corresponding LTL theorem
in SAL syntax generated by ARSENAL.
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REQ4: If the end system is in ES FLOOD state, it shall eventually not be in ES FLOOD state.
THEOREM main |- G((end_system = ES_FLOOD_state =>
F(NOT(end_system = ES_FLOOD_state))));
We applied bounded model checking, a model checking technique that checks if the model satisfies the
requirement within a bounded number of transitions, and found a counterexample. This counterexample
reveals that if the environment keeps sending a coldstart frame to this module, then local timer, which
maintains a count to timeout in the ES FLOOD state, will keep resetting to 0 and thus preventing any
transition out of the ES FLOOD state to occur. This helped us identify the missing assumption (absent in
the original documentation) that was needed for system verification. In fact, modular verification is one of
the most difficult tasks in verification since it requires the precise specifications of the constraints on the
environment. These constraints are often implicit and undocumented. In this case, the interaction of multiple
end-systems should ensure that any end-system will not receive a coldstart frame infinitely often before it
can exit the ES FLOOD state.
5 Related Work
The main advantages of ARSENAL over prior work in requirements engineering are a less restrictive NL
front-end, a more powerful FM analysis framework, and the ability to generate a full formal model directly
from NL text.
[KGFP08], [SACO02] and [Shi02] propose grammars for representing requirements in template-based
natural language. [ZGM01], [GZ05], [SCK04], [XPTX12], [DJP11], [RP92], [Rya93], [DJLW06], [Kof05],
etc. process stylized NL text using NLP tools and perform different types of checks (e.g., consistency, access
control) on the requirements. Compared to these methods, ARSENAL uses more state-of-the-art NLP and
FM techniques, and is able to generate a full formal model from input NL requirements using minimal user
supervision.
[DDG+12], [SWD12], and [Har12] show different ways of translating high-level NL requirements to tests
in the behavior-driven development (BDD) framework. ARSENAL is more general — instead of considering
requirements in the test phase, it considers NL specifications that can be specified in earlier design phases.
Attempto Controlled English (ACE) [SF96], RECORD [Bor96] and T-RED [BS96] are interactive re-
quirements processing tools requiring inputs from domain experts, and are not as automated as ARSENAL.
Related work in semantic parsing includes PropBank [KP03], which annotates text with specific semantic
propositions, and SEMAFOR [DSCS10], which learns semantic frames per sentence. [LJK11] introduce a
new semantic representation, dependency-based compositional semantics (DCS), for learning to map ques-
tions to answers. ARSENAL’s predicate graph is more general than DCS, as it has both mention-level and
relation-level semantic annotations. [CM11] focus on parsing NL instructions to get a navigational plan for
routing, and learn a semantic parser for the task. [WHH+13] have a framework for learning generalized
grounding graphs for learning semantic maps from natural language descriptions. ARSENAL can handle
a more general class of output models, e.g., SAL. [RDKS14] propose a scheme for generating formulas for
question/answering from NL requirements, using semantic parsing — in ARSENAL, we built an end-to-
end system to generate a complete model with appropriate semantics from multiple requirements, and did
thorough empirical evaluation.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
ARSENAL converts NL requirements to formal models in an automated fashion, which can be further refined
through iterations with a human in the loop. It provides an NL front-end to formal analysis that is flexible to
adapt to usages in different domains. To that end, ARSENAL can be an important aid for a system designer
in designing high-assurance systems, while reducing cost in the overall design and manufacturing process.
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In the future, we want to test ARSENAL on other domains, generate other models (e.g., Markov Logic
Networks), and go beyond NL text to handle flow-charts, diagrams and tables. We would also like to explore
learning, e.g., in the NLP stage we currently create the type rules manually — we would like to use a learning
algorithm like FOIL [Qui90] or Propminer [AKM13] to learn type rules. We would also like to explore active
learning for incorporating user feedback.
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